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Abstract. Using the Consensus Economics dataset with individual expert
forecasts from G7 countries we investigate determinants of disagreement (cross-
sectional dispersion of forecasts) about six key economic indicators. Disagree-
ment about real variables (GDP, consumption, investment and unemploy-
ment) has a distinct dynamic from disagreement about nominal variables
(inﬂation and interest rate). Disagreement about real variables intensiﬁes
strongly during recessions, including the current one (by about 40 percent in
terms of the interquartile range). Disagreement about nominal variables rises
with their level, has fallen after 1998 or so (by 30 percent), and is consider-
ably lower under independent central banks (by 35 percent). Cross-sectional
dispersion for both groups increases with uncertainty about the underlying
actual indicators, though to a lesser extent for nominal series. Country-
by-country regressions for inﬂation and interest rates reveal that both the
level of disagreement and its sensitivity to macroeconomic variables tend to
be larger in Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, where central banks be-
came independent only around the mid-1990s. These ﬁndings suggest that
more credible monetary policy can substantially contribute to anchoring of
expectations about nominal variables; its eﬀects on disagreement about real
variables are moderate.
Keywords: disagreement, survey expectations, monetary policy, forecasting
JEL Classiﬁcation: E31, E32, E37, E52, C535
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Non-technical Summary
Macroeconomic models often impose homogeneity. Agents have the same
preferences, beliefs, information sets, are hit with the same shocks or process
information in the same way. Such assumptions are convenient because they
make models simple and tractable while keeping them useful for aggregate policy
analysis. However, evidence from micro data and casual observations show that
people diﬀer from each other, and economists have recently put much eﬀort into
constructing and studying models that can account for some of the diﬀerences.
Expectations are known to be a crucial determinant of economic dynamics.
Although existing micro datasets make it possible to measure and test many
aspects of heterogeneity (e.g., diﬀerences in income, portfolios, demographics,
shocks or labor force status), they typically contain little information about
expectations. In addition, even when such information exists, the length and
frequency of the series do not allow to adequately investigate how the cross-
sectional distribution of expectations varies over time, business cycle and with
economic policy. Consequently, there has been little work on joint analysis of
individual survey expectations across countries and variables with micro data.
We investigate determinants of disagreement (cross-sectional dispersion of
forecasts) about six key economic indicators in G7 countries roughly over the
past twenty years. Using a unique dataset with individual expert forecasts from
Consensus Economics we provide a set of statistics that capture the key features
of dynamics of disagreement and are consistently calculated across countries and
variables. The dataset has been used quite extensively (see references below) but
most work investigates the central tendency—consensus—not the cross-sectional
distribution of forecasts. Although it is often challenging in large datasets like
ours, which covers six variables in seven countries, to ﬁnd consistent results, to
summarize them and interpret, a number of results emerge quite clearly from
our analysis.
We ﬁnd that disagreement about real variables (GDP, consumption, invest-
ment and unemployment) has a distinct dynamic from disagreement about nom-
inal variables (inﬂation and interest rate). Disagreement about real variables
intensiﬁes strongly during recessions (by about 40 percent in terms of the in-
terquartile range). Disagreement about nominal variables rises with their level,
has fallen after 1998 or so (by 30 percent), and is considerably lower under inde-
pendent central banks (by 35 percent). For both groups cross-sectional disper-
sion increases with uncertainty about the underlying actual indicators, though
to a lesser extent for nominal series, and disagreement is more strongly cross-
correlated among variables within the groups than between them.
While we provide simple and transparent reduced-form estimates, we believe
our statistics also suggest a causal relationship: central bank independence re-
duces disagreement about nominal variables. Country-by-country regressions
for inﬂation and interest rates reveal that both the level of disagreement and
its sensitivity to macroeconomic variables tend to be larger in Italy, Japan and
the United Kingdom, where central banks became independent only around the
mid-1990s. These ﬁndings suggest that more credible monetary policy can sub-
stantially contribute to anchoring of expectations about nominal variables. In
contrast, its eﬀects on disagreement about real variables are moderate.6
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While our analysis uses data on expectations of professional forecasters, qual-
itatively similar results may obtain also for other economists (in industry, gov-
ernment and academia) and households. This could be the case if our data are
taken as a proxy for expectations of the rest of population, or if news spread
epidemiologically from experts to other agents.
We believe our results could be of interest to both policy-makers and re-
searchers. The large literature on monetary theory and policy agrees that an-
chored inﬂation expectations are of utter importance for safeguarding of price
stability. Much work has documented that the inﬂation and GDP processes in
G7 countries moderated in the late 1980s and their volatility has been falling
further most of the time until recently. Our dataset conﬁrms the existing ﬁnd-
ings that the consensus (mean) expectations have also stabilized for most coun-
tries and variables. However, for expectations to be perfectly anchored it is
necessary that also their cross-sectional dispersion—disagreement—disappears.
Our results document across several countries and variables the extent to which
this has been the case and suggest how economic shocks and monetary pol-
icy setting contributed to the reduction of disagreement we often ﬁnd in the
2000s. Researchers could use the stylized facts we report to calibrate, test and
improve models with heterogeneous beliefs, learning or information processing
constraints, which have recently become quite widespread.7
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1. Introduction
Macroeconomic models often impose homogeneity. Agents have the same
preferences, beliefs, information sets, are hit with the same shocks or process
information in the same way. Such assumptions are convenient because they
make models simple and tractable while keeping them useful for aggregate policy
analysis. However, evidence from micro data and casual observations show that
people diﬀer from each other, and economists have recently put much eﬀort into
constructing and studying models that can account for some of the diﬀerences.
1
Expectations are known to be a crucial determinant of economic dynamics.
2
Although existing micro data sets make it possible to measure and test many
aspects of heterogeneity (e.g., diﬀerences in income, portfolios, demographics,
shocks or labor force status), they typically contain little information about
expectations. In addition, even when such information exists, the length and
frequency of the series do not allow to adequately investigate how the cross-
sectional distribution of expectations varies over time, business cycle and with
economic policy. Consequently, there has been little work on joint analysis of
individual survey expectations across countries and variables.
We investigate determinants of disagreement (cross-sectional dispersion of
forecasts) about six key economic indicators in G7 countries roughly over the
past twenty years. Using a unique data set with individual expert forecasts from
Consensus Economics we provide a set of statistics that capture the key features
of dynamics of disagreement and are consistently calculated across countries and
variables. The data set has been used quite extensively (see references below) but
most work investigates the central tendency—consensus—not the cross-sectional
distribution of forecasts. Although it is often challenging in large data sets like
ours, which covers six variables in seven countries, to ﬁnd consistent results, to
summarize them and interpret, a number of results emerge quite clearly from
our analysis.
We ﬁnd that disagreement about real variables (GDP, consumption, invest-
ment and unemployment) has a distinct dynamic from disagreement about nom-
inal variables (inﬂation and interest rate). Disagreement about real variables
intensiﬁes strongly during recessions (by about 40 percent in terms of the in-
terquartile range). Disagreement about nominal variables rises with their level,
has fallen after 1998 or so (by 30 percent), and is considerably lower under inde-
pendent central banks (by 35 percent). For both groups cross-sectional disper-
sion increases with uncertainty about the underlying actual indicators, though
1For example, models in which some households are more impatient than others (or are sub-
ject to liquidity constraints) are useful in studying the monetary policy transmission mechanism
(Iacoviello, 2005). Models with heterogeneous beliefs/expectations are becoming popular in as-
set pricing literature (see Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003 for a survey). Carroll (1997)a n dKrusell
and Smith (1998) model reaction of agents’ consumption–saving behavior to idiosyncratic (and
aggregate) income shocks. Morris and Shin (2005b) investigate the value of providing of public
information to agents depending on the amount of private information they have.
2See Bernanke (2004), Morris and Shin (2005a), Woodford (2005) and many others.8
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to a lesser extent for nominal series, and disagreement is more strongly cross-
correlated among variables within the groups than between them.
While we provide simple and transparent reduced-form estimates, we believe
our statistics also suggest a causal relationship: central bank independence re-
duces disagreement about nominal variables. Country-by-country regressions
for inﬂation and interest rates reveal that both the level of disagreement and
its sensitivity to macroeconomic variables tend to be larger in Italy, Japan and
the United Kingdom, where central banks became independent only around the
mid-1990s. These ﬁndings suggest that more credible monetary policy can sub-
stantially contribute to anchoring of expectations about nominal variables. In
contrast, its eﬀects on disagreement about real variables are moderate.
We believe our results could be of interest to both policy-makers and re-
searchers. The large literature on monetary theory and policy agrees that an-
chored inﬂation expectations are of utter importance for safeguarding of price
stability. Much work (including Cogley and Sargent, 2001; Stock and Watson,
2002 and Stock and Watson, 2005) has documented that the inﬂation and GDP
processes in G7 countries moderated in the late 1980s and their volatility has
been falling further most of the time until recently.
3 Our data set conﬁrms the
existing ﬁndings that the consensus (mean) expectations have also stabilized for
most countries and variables. However, for expectations to be perfectly anchored
it is necessary (though not suﬃcient) that also their cross-sectional dispersion—
disagreement—disappears. Our results document across several countries and
variables the extent to which this has been the case and suggest how economic
shocks and monetary policy setting contributed to the reduction of disagreement
we often ﬁnd in the 2000s. Researchers could use the stylized facts we report to
calibrate, test and improve models with heterogeneous beliefs, learning or infor-
mation processing constraints, which have recently become quite widespread.
4
Our work builds on two strands of literature on survey expectations. The ﬁrst
and larger area analyzes the central tendency in expectations about inﬂation,
GDP, interest rates and exchange rates.
5 The second, more recent and more
3More precisely, the work typically ﬁnds that the variance of the permanent component of
inﬂation and GDP was declining before 2006 or so. In addition, evidence below documents that
the average variance of the permanent component of the six series we investigate was typically
higher in the 1990s than in the 2000s.
4For example, Erceg and Levin (2003) use the consensus inﬂation expectations from the
US Survey of Professional Forecasters to calibrate the signal-to-noise ratio, which determines
how households and ﬁrms disentangle persistent shifts in inﬂation target from transitory dis-
turbances in the monetary policy rule. The ratio is the key determinant of the persistence of
actual inﬂation and output. Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) compare how the sticky infor-
mation model matches cross-sectional dispersion of inﬂation forecasts in various US surveys.
Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2009) document that uncertainty about economic activity is
strongly counter-cyclical and build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with het-
erogeneous ﬁrms, non-convex adjustment costs and changing variance of productivity shocks.
In such model a rise in uncertainty leads to a fall in output.
5For example, Branch (2004) estimates a model of boundedly rational agents on inﬂation ex-
pectations from the Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior of the University of Michigan.
Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) ﬁnd that survey expectations provide better inﬂation forecasts9
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closely related body of work investigates heterogeneity in expectations, often
using micro data. The key inspiration for our work is a recent important paper
of Mankiw et al. (2003), which analyzes central tendency and dispersion of in-
ﬂation expectations using several US survey data sets, and tests some theories
of disagreement. Separate work of Souleles (2004) uses the Michigan Survey of
Consumer Attitudes and Behavior to examine the ability of various groups of
population to forecast consumption expenditure. Blanchﬂower and Kelly (2008)
study determinants of inﬂation expectations in the Bank of England’s Inﬂation
Attitudes Survey and the European Commission’s consumer survey. Patton
and Timmermann (2008b) use a simple reduced-form state-space model to ex-
plain the cross-sectional dispersion of US GDP growth and inﬂation forecasts
and argue that forecasters’ heterogeneity in prior beliefs is more important than
heterogeneity in information sets. Lahiri and Sheng (2009) show, using a decom-
position of forecasts errors into common and idiosyncratic shocks, that aggregate
forecast uncertainty can be expressed as a combination of disagreement among
the forecasters and the perceived variability of future aggregate shocks. Carroll
(2003) bridges the two strands of literature by proposing and testing a model
of average inﬂation and unemployment expectations of households interact with
those of experts. But joint analysis of individual survey expectations across
countries and variables is so far under-researched.
The estimates below capture dynamic correlations, conditional on the explana-
tory variables included in the regressions. Besides being potentially subject to
standard econometric issues, such as mis-speciﬁcation or omitted-variable bias,
our estimates can to some extent be aﬀected by endogeneity and, as a result,
caution is required to draw strong conclusions about the causal nature of the es-
timated relationships. We have undertaken a large number of robustness checks
(some of which are in the online appendix). We believe the results reported in
this paper are reasonably stable although it is of course likely that future work
on the topic will provide new, more reﬁned insights.
than macro variables or asset markets. Bernanke and Boivin (2003) and Faust and Wright
(2007) compare the Greenbook inﬂation and GDP forecasts (produced by the US Federal Re-
serve) to predictions generated by reduced-form econometric models. Kim and Orphanides
(2005), Piazzesi and Schneider (2008) and others use interest rate expectations from the US
Survey of Professional Forecasters to improve on the existing yield curve models.
Much work, like us, uses the Consensus Economics data set, although often just the central
tendency rather than the whole cross-section of observations. For example, Engel and Rogers
(2008) and Devereux, Smith, and Yetman (2009) use expectations of consumption, inﬂation
and exchange rates to test models of international risk sharing. Engel, Mark, and West (2008)
feed inﬂation forecasts into the present-value model of the exchange rate in order to evaluate
its forecasting performance. Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) investigate the degree to which
inﬂation expectations are anchored in industrial countries. Patton and Timmermann (2008a)
study how uncertainty about macroeconomic variables is resolved using forecasts of US inﬂation
and GDP growth.
Separate large literature exists on extracting inﬂation expectations from prices of indexed
bonds. For example G¨ urkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006), Ehrmann, Fratzscher, G¨ urkaynak,
and Swanson (2007) and Beechey, Johannsen, and Levin (2008) use high-frequency ﬁnancial
data to provide evidence complementary to ours on anchoring of long-run inﬂation expectations
in the euro area, Sweden, the UK and the US.10
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2. The Data
2.1. The Data Set. We use a leading cross-country survey data set compiled
by Consensus Economics, http://www.consensuseconomics.com/, a London-
based economic survey organization.6 Each month, starting in October 1989,
Consensus Economics polls experts from public and private economic institu-
tions, mostly investment banks and economic research institutes, about their
predictions about the most common macroeconomic indicators. Neither central
banks nor governments participate in the survey. Our sample ranges between
October 1989 and October 2006 and consists of 205 monthly observations.
While the survey is now conducted in more than twenty countries, the largest
sample in terms of length and cross-sectional dimension (number of respondents)
is available for G7 countries.7 Essentially the same survey is conducted in all G7
countries using the same procedure: forecasters ﬁll out the survey form mostly
electronically in the ﬁrst two weeks of each month and the data are published
around the middle of the month. In addition, country-speciﬁc expertise is guar-
anteed as most panelists are located in the country they are analyzing. Conse-
quently, the data set is comparable both across countries and across panelists,
and collects some of the best economic forecasts.
The data set covers all principal macroeconomic indicators. We focus on the
following six: consumer-price inﬂation, nominal three-month interest rate, GDP
growth, consumption growth, investment growth and unemployment rate.8 Al-
though the survey contains information on other variables (most importantly,
industrial/manufacturing production, producer prices, wages, current account
and budget balance), their coverage in terms of time period, countries and num-
ber of respondents is less complete. These additional indicators are also arguably
less important and often less closely followed by forecasters than those we focus
on.
Before the analysis we cleaned and transformed the data as follows. The
starting point are the expectations series as given in the reports of Consensus
Economics. We are able to keep track of the series of each forecaster and at-
tempt to follow them as their institutions merged with others, were taken over
or renamed (see the the online appendix). We checked the individual expecta-
tions, which substantially diﬀer from others (e.g., three inﬂation expectations in
6Several other data sets of economic forecasts of experts exist both in the US (Survey of
Professional Forecasters and the Livingston Survey) and in Europe (European Central Bank’s
Survey of Professional Forecasters). These surveys typically cover only a single country or
economic region (euro area), a subset of variables (most prominently inﬂation), or a shorter
time period than the Consensus Economics survey.
7Although the survey currently covers all major industrial countries and many emerging
economies, data from some relatively large European countries (such as Spain, the Netherlands
or Sweden) have only been available since December 1994. Expectations about the euro area
variables only go back to December 2002 (and are subject to composition eﬀects as new countries
joined the monetary union).
8We have also investigated expectations about industrial production but only report these
results, which are broadly consistent with those for GDP in the online appendix.11
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Japan in February and March 2002) and made sure they correctly reﬂect the
ﬁgures in the reports.9 For each respondent some observations—typically about
10 percent—were linearly interpolated when a single observation was missing
(and both adjacent observations were available) within a year or when two ob-
servations were missing at the beginning or at the end of the year.
2.2. Fixed Event and Fixed Horizon Forecasts. Except for interest rates,
the respondents give their expectations over the current and the next calendar
year; the survey data thus provides series of ﬁxed event forecasts.10 However, we
believe ﬁxed horizon (e.g., one-year-ahead) forecasts are preferable for the anal-
ysis of disagreement because forecasting horizon of ﬁxed event forecasts varies
from month to month and consequently their uncertainty and cross-sectional
dispersion is strongly seasonal. In addition, we use ﬁxed horizon forecasts be-
cause we want to provide comparable results to much of the literature, including
Mankiw et al., 2003.
We approximate ﬁxed horizon forecasts as a weighted average of ﬁxed event
forecasts as follows. Denote Ffe
y0,m,y1(x) the ﬁxed event forecast of variable x for
year y1 made in month m of previous year, y0=y1−1, and Ffh
y0,m,12(x) the ﬁxed
horizon, twelve-month-ahead forecast made at the same time. For example, the
November 2008 forecast for year 2009 is Ffe
2008,11,2009(x). We approximate the
ﬁxed horizon forecast for the next twelve months as an average of the forecasts












For example, the November 2008 forecast of inﬂation rate between November
2008 and November 2009 is approximated by the sum of Ffe
2008,11,2008(π) and
Ffe
2008,11,2009(π) weighted by 2
12 and 10
12 respectively.
We use this procedure for the ﬁve variables with the exception of interest rate,
which is reported as the ﬁxed-horizon forecast of interest rate between now and
three months from now.
Because the disagreement series is used only as the dependent variable, the
approximation/measurement error in series Ffh
y0,m,12(x) from (1) does not aﬀect
the consistency of the regression estimates obtained below as long as the error
is not correlated with regressors. Such correlation should be relatively low also
given the high, monthly frequency of the data.
It is ultimately an empirical question how well our approximation performs.
Using ﬁxed event and ﬁxed horizon forecasts in the US Survey of Professional
9It is possible that these outliers could have been due to typing errors by respondents.
However, our measure of disagreement—the cross-sectional interquartile range—is robust to
the presence of a limited number of outliers.
10Once every quarter the survey includes additional questions for selected variables (CPI
inﬂation, GDP, consumption) on the ﬁxed horizon predictions for roughly the following two
years. However, these questions are not useful for the analysis of disagreement because only
the consensus (mean) forecasts are published.12
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Forecasters, Dovern and Fritsche (2008) ﬁnd that approach (1) captures well
cross-sectional dispersion of predictions. Correlation between cross-sectional dis-
persion in (1) and the true dispersion of ﬁxed horizon forecasts is roughly 0.8–0.9
when measured with standard deviation and 0.6–0.9 for the interquartile range
(IQR). The remaining nine methods Dovern and Fritsche investigate, includ-
ing several speciﬁcations with unobserved components and seasonal adjustment,
typically correlate with the true dispersion at 0.5–0.9 for standard deviation and
0.2–0.8 for the interquartile range.
As the ﬁnal issue, we need to decide about our preferred measure of cross-
sectional dispersion of forecasts. Throughout the paper we use the width of the
interquartile range, the diﬀerence between the third and ﬁrst quartile of obser-
vations. We do so to be consistent with the previous work (Mankiw et al., 2003)
and because the IQR is also likely to be more robust to outliers than standard
deviation. The results for disagreement measured with standard deviation are
consistent with those presented below, which is not surprising given the rela-
tively high correlation (0.7–0.8) between the two measures shown in Table 15 in
the Appendix.11
2.3. Descriptive Statistics. Before we analyze disagreement among forecast-
ers in more detail, let’s have a closer look at the data. Figures 1–6 compare
the expected and actual variables. The actual series are shifted backward by
twelve months so that the vertical diﬀerence between them and expectations is
the expectation error. (For example, for November 2003, the dots denote expec-
tations of one-year ahead inﬂation rate and the actual series is inﬂation between
November 2003 and November 2004.) The shaded areas denote recessions as
identiﬁed by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (using the business cycle
method, which mirrors the NBER procedure).
Three ﬁndings appear for all six expectation series. First, expectations are
more stable than the actual series as the actual series contain substantial unpre-
dictable and volatile component.
Second, expectations are sensitive to current conditions: expected one-year
ahead rates are quite strongly correlated with the currently observed rates. This
is perhaps not surprising in case of inﬂation, interest rate and unemployment,
which are generally known to be quite persistent (so that the last observation
is a good predictor of the future one(s)). However, the sensitivity to current
conditions is also apparent—although to a lesser extent—for variables like GDP
growth, which are not highly serially correlated.
Third, expectations are sluggish in that they typically overestimate the de-
velopments when the underlying variable is falling. This ﬁnding is apparent
11For a normal distribution standard deviation (stdev) is proportional to the interquartile
range, stdev = 1.349×IQR (because the 75th percentile of the standard normal distribution is
0.6745). This scaling on average roughly holds in our data, e.g. for inﬂation in Canada average
I Q R=0 .34 and stdev×1.3 4 9=0 .26 × 1.3 4 9=0 .35. The Shapiro–Wilk test does not reject
normality in cross-section about 85–90 percent of time (somewhat below what is implied by its
nominal size of 0.05).13
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for example during the disinﬂations of the early 1990s when inﬂation expecta-
tions errors were on average positive. The result is clearer for more persistent
variables—inﬂation, interest rates and unemployment—than for those subject
to large transitory ﬂuctuations (GDP, consumption and investment).
Table 1 summarizes the key descriptive statistics about expectations and ac-
tual series. Average number of forecasters, displayed in the ﬁrst line of each
panel, typically ranges between 15 and 35 and shows little systematic variation
over time: while in Canada, Japan and the US it is approximately constant, it
rises somewhat in France, Germany and Italy and falls in the UK after 2000 or
so. The number of respondents does not correlate with the phase of the business
cycle, and varies little across variables (in a given country). Observations for
each forecaster are available for about half of the time on average.
The second line in each panel shows the mean expectation error averaged
across forecasters and time periods. The individual forecasts are not statistically
signiﬁcantly biased partly because the standard deviation of expectation errors
is quite large. (The bias of consensus, or mean, forecasts is signiﬁcant for a few
variables in some countries.) Average expectation errors are typically positive,
which may reﬂect forecasters’ optimism or sluggishness (where the trend in the
underlying variable is falling most of the time, such as in the case of inﬂation
and interest rates).
12 There are few systematic diﬀerences across countries (for
example, while the US respondents do well in the case of interest rate, they are
the worst in the case of consumption).
13
Lines three, four and ﬁve give the average mean squared errors of forecasts,
average level of the underlying variable and its variance respectively (taken over
the sample period October 1989–October 2006). The level and the variance
of economic variables can plausibly be positively correlated—see Ball and Cec-
chetti (1990) and Ball (1992)
14 on empirical and theoretical investigation for
inﬂation—and both can positively correlate with the MSEs (and also disagree-
ment). However, the evidence in Table 1, based on variables averaged over the
sample and summarized in the top panels of Figure 7, implies if anything a neg-
ative correlation between the MSE and the level of the underlying variable.
15
In contrast, imprecision of expectations tends to increase with the variance of
the underlying variable, as one would expect. While Figure 7 is subject to
many criticisms—such as that the relationship is only bivariate and based on
12Bias of inﬂation forecasts tends to quite high and positive before 1999 and negative
afterwards.
13Detailed investigation of bias and eﬃciency of forecasts is beyond the scope of this paper.
Large literature exists on this topic, mostly testing GDP, inﬂation and unemployment forecasts,
including work that uses our data set, e.g. Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold (2001), Isiklar,
Lahiri, and Loungani (2006), Batchelor (2007), and Ager, Kappler, and Osterloh (2009).
14Ball (1992) proposes a model in which the level of inﬂation and its uncertainty are positively
correlated because when inﬂation is high, policy-makers face a dilemma: they would like to
disinﬂate but fear the resulting recession.
15Note that investment, being an outlier due to large MSEs, is excluded from the Figure to
be able to assess if the positive relationship between the MSE and variance holds even without
it.14
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time-averaged statistics—we believe it is an interesting starting point for a more
careful regression analysis of disagreement below.
16
3. Drivers of Disagreement
The previous section summarized some key properties of individual expecta-
tions. In contrast, this section focuses on the disagreement among forecasters—
deﬁned as cross-sectional dispersion and measured with the cross-section in-
terquartile range—its evolution over time and its relationship to the business
cycle and monetary policy.
3.1. A First Look at Disagreement. Line six in each panel of Table 1 sum-
marizes the average disagreement by country and variable. Full-sample time-
average of disagreement about inﬂation is relatively low for France, Germany
and Italy. Cross-sectional dispersion of interest rates is quite high in Canada
and the US, relatively low in France and Germany, and extremely low in Japan,
the last ﬁnding being driven by eﬀectively zero interest rates for much of the
time since 2000. Forecasters in France, Germany and Italy agree to a large ex-
tent on GDP growth, compared to their counterparts in the UK, Canada and
in particular Japan (where the dynamics are again dominated by the recession
part of the sample). While the series for consumption growth is smoother than
that for GDP growth, disagreement about consumption tends to be somewhat
higher, driven perhaps by less attention that some forecasters pay to the con-
sumption series. However, the two disagreement series correlate quite strongly,
which one could expect given the large share of consumption in GDP (see also
Figures 10–11 below for time perspective). Disagreement about investment is
substantially larger than for other series because of its high volatility. Unem-
ployment on the other hand is smooth (and predictable), which translates into
little disagreement.
17
Figures 8–13 illustrate the evolution of disagreement over time by country and
variable. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the monthly frequency of our sample, dis-
agreement is subject to much transitory but quite persistent variation. However,
two ﬁndings arise in several countries and series. First, disagreement tends to
rise during recessions. Second, there is a downward time trend in disagreement.
Disagreement about inﬂation in Figure 8 is roughly constant in France and
Germany but falls steadily after 1992 or so in Italy, as the country was expected
to join the euro area, in Japan and in the UK. The series is quite strongly anti-
cyclical (in terms of the diﬀerence between its average in recessions and booms)
in Canada, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US.
As shown in Figure 9, disagreement about interest rate tends to trend down-
ward in all countries except for the US and its dynamics is strongly anti-cyclical
16Because the focus of this paper is on disagreement, we will not investigate the determinants
of MSEs below.
17The somewhat higher mean for Germany is driven by the uncertainty about labor market
statistics during the re-uniﬁcation.15
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(except for Japan where there was little disagreement when the interest rates
lied close to zero).
Disagreement about GDP growth in Figure 10 is again anti-cyclical, except
for France; in the remaining countries it is typically 30–50% higher in recessions
than in booms. Disagreement about the remaining real variables (consumption,
investment and unemployment) broadly tracks that of GDP.
One can think of at least two structural breaks in our sample: the introduction
of the euro in January 1999 and the German re-uniﬁcation in October 1990. The
expectations of the ﬁrst event seem to have aﬀected disagreement about inﬂation
in Italy, which started to fall following the breakdown of the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism in September 1992. Disagreement in the remaining two euro
area members, France and Germany, has been roughly constant perhaps because
the inﬂation rate in these two countries has been low and stable. Figures 8–13
show, the structural break due to the German re-uniﬁcation in October 1990
temporarily elevated disagreement about real variables (GDP, consumption, in-
vestment and unemployment), but not about inﬂation and interest rate. To a
large extent unrelated to these two events, there has been much dynamics in
disagreement of various series, in particular the clear downward trend in the UK
and cyclical dynamics in most countries. We investigate these developments in
more detail below using simple regression analysis.
3.2. Disagreement over Time. To provide quantitative insights Tables 2–7
use the ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimator (in which coeﬃcients other than the constant
are restricted to be the same in all countries
18) to assess general trends common
in all countries. We discuss the results for the three most important indicators—
inﬂation, interest rates and GDP—in more detail and summarize the remaining
variables (consumption, investment and unemployment) only brieﬂy.
The top panel (Panel A) of each of Tables 2–7 investigates how disagreement
(“disagr”) varies over time and during recessions using two versions of regression:
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + ut,
where “rec” denotes the recession dummy and “post-1998” is the dummy for the
second part of the sample.
Disagreement about inﬂation is analyzed in Table 2. Row 1 reports that the
cross-sectional interquartile range averaged across countries and time is about
0.3, which suggests that half of the forecasters typically lie within 0.15 percentage
points of the consensus. Row 2 shows that disagreement rises by about 15 percent
during recessions, a fact that can be due to the increase in general macroeconomic
uncertainty, and that disagreement is much lower—by 25%—in the second part
of the sample, after 1998.
Qualitatively similar ﬁndings obtain for disagreement about interest rates and
GDP growth and are reported in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. For both variables,
disagreement rises during recessions and falls after 1998. While the eﬀects for
18The constant term β0 in the Tables is normalized to give the average of country-speciﬁc
intercepts.16
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interest rates are quantitatively similar to those for inﬂation, the increase in
disagreement about GDP during recessions is almost twice as large—44 percent
(and the fall after 1998 is less pronounced). This seems reasonable as macroeco-
nomic uncertainty during a recession is skewed toward GDP (and less evident for
interest rates and, in particular, inﬂation). The ﬁnding is also closely in line with
the evidence in Bloom et al. (2009), who construct a synthetic index of aggregate
uncertainty based on measures of cross-ﬁrm and cross-industry dispersion, time
variation of aggregate data and forecaster disagreement (about GDP growth
and unemployment rate); the index of Bloom et al. indicates that uncertainty
increases by 42.5 percent during recessions. Results for consumption growth,
investment growth and unemployment rate in Tables 5, 6 and 7 respectively are
again qualitatively consistent with the rest.
Qualitatively, the estimates (together with those of Tables 2–3) suggest that
the recession diﬀerential in disagreement—the diﬀerence between average dis-
agreement in a recession and a boom—is generally larger for real variables (GDP,
consumption, investment and unemployment) than for the two nominal vari-
ables. In contrast, the fall in disagreement after 1998 tends to be smaller for real
variables than for nominal ones.
Two important broad factors behind the variation in disagreement can be
the shocks to economic variables and economic policy. Larger shocks boost the
volatility of the underlying actual variables and make them less predictable. As
a result, forecasters are more likely to disagree about future outcomes (because
of using diﬀerent models, priors, subjective probabilities or data). More credible
economic policies can make economic indicators easier to forecast. An obvious
example is the introduction of an explicit numerical inﬂation target, which can
contribute to better anchoring of inﬂation expectations. Similarly, independent
central banks are often perceived as better safeguards to price stability (and
can indirectly also contribute to the stabilization of output). We investigate
these two factors—economic shocks and policies—in a simple reduced-form setup
below but before doing so we ﬁrst have to measure them.
3.3. An Intermezzo on Macroeconomic Volatility. To capture the shocks
that hit the underlying actual variable xt we employ the following unobserved
component stochastic volatility (UCSV) model of Stock and Watson (2007),
which is a simple, canonical device to decompose a series into the permanent
and the transitory part with time-varying volatility.19 Intuitively, the dynamics
of xt are driven by a permanent component τt with white noise innovations εt
19The same speciﬁcation is used in Wright (2008) to model inﬂation; Stock and Watson
(2002) and Stock and Watson (2005) propose variants of this model for GDP, consumption,
investment, employment and many other variables. Similar, more sophisticated models are
analyzed in Harvey and Trimbur (2003), Creal, Koopman, and Zivot (2008), Giordani and
Kohn (2008) and elsewhere.17
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and a transitory component ηt:
xt = τt + ηt, (2)
τt = τt−1 + εt. (3)
Both ηt and εt are independently normally distributed and have time-varying
(random-walk) variances σ2
η,t and σ2
ε,t respectively (ηt ∼ N(0,σ2




η,t−1 + νη,t, (4)
logσ2
ε,t = logσ2
ε,t−1 + νε,t. (5)
Innovations to variances νt =( νη,t,ν ε,t)
  are iid N(0,γI 2) and γ is a scalar
parameter which controls the smoothness of the estimated volatilities σ2
·,t.W e
estimate the model with the Gibbs sampling.20 We use the UCSV model as a
ﬂexible device to capture how the volatility of shocks varies over time. In the
regressions below we investigate how disagreement correlates with the variance
σ2
ε,t because permanent uncertainty driven by shocks εt is much more important
for the formation of expectations (over the next twelve months) than transitory
uncertainty due to ηt, which subsides immediately.21
Figures 14–19 summarize the dynamics of the variance of permanent shocks
σ2
ε,t. Full-sample averages of σ2
ε,t across countries and variables tend to positively
co-move with those of disagreement. For example, both shocks to investment
and disagreement about it are substantially higher than for other variables. Per-
manent shocks to inﬂation have be quite modest for France, Germany and Italy,
and permanent shocks to consumption have generally been larger than those to
GDP.
Variance of permanent shocks is also positively related to the path of dis-
agreement over time. Forecasters disagree more when the economy is hit with
larger permanent shocks, in particular in recessions but to a lesser extent also
before 1999 (compared to the post-1998 period). The key message to take away
from the comparison of Figures 8–13 and 14–19 is that both economic shocks
and disagreement are more substantial during recessions and tended to be more
muted in the second part of our sample. In addition, the anti-cyclicality of dis-
agreement and shocks is somewhat more pronounced for real variables than for
inﬂation.
20The online appendix shows the diagnostics we used to assess the quality of the MCMC
approximation.
21As a robustness exercise we have also proxied uncertainty about the underlying variable
xt simply with its one-year squared diﬀerence Δ12x
2
t =( xt − xt−12)
2. An advantage of that
measure is that it is independent of the parametric model used to back out σ
2
ε,t. For the






η,t. Estimation results for
this alternative measure of uncertainty (Δ12x
2
t) are broadly consistent with the baseline shown
below in sections 3.4 and 3.5. One diﬀerence is that disagreement about inﬂation correlates more
strongly with Δ12INFL
2
t than with σ
2
INFL,ε,t. This is not surprising because both measures of
uncertainty co-move quite closely, with correlation of more than 0.4. (Estimation results and




x,ε,t are shown in the online appendix.)18
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3.4. Disagreement and Macro Variables. The middle panel (Panel B) of Ta-
bles 2–7 investigates how disagreement correlates with the level of the underlying
actual variables, uncertainty about these variables proxied with the variance of
permanent shocks, output gap22 and the squared change in the policy interest
rate (Δpolicy rate2
t)—a proxy of the variation in monetary policy:
disagrt = β0 + β2 × xt + β3 × σ2
x,t + β4 × output gapt + β5 × Δpolicy rate2
t + ut,
where xt denotes the level of the underlying variable and σ2
x,t is a short-hand
notation for the variance σ2
x,ε,t of permanent shocks to xt (as given in equation
(5)).
Disagreement about inﬂation rate increases with its level: one percentage
point increase in inﬂation raises the cross-sectional interquartile range by 0.026,
or about 10 percent (with respect to the mean 0.299). The direct eﬀect of in-
ﬂation uncertainty (the term σ2
INFL,t), while correctly signed, is statistically
insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on output gap is negative, which is in line with the
previous evidence that disagreement increases during recessions. Finally, dis-
agreement about inﬂation rises when monetary policy rates change, which again
tends to coincide with recessions. (But the positive coeﬃcient on interest rates
is signiﬁcant even when output gap is included.) In addition, including interest
rates among explanatory variables substantially increases the explanatory power
of the regression.
Disagreement about interest rates shown in Table 3 rises with the level, un-
certainty and squared change of rates. These ﬁndings are in line with the fact
reported in panel A that disagreement about interest rates fell after 1998, as
both the level and variation in rates is much lower in the second part of the sam-
ple (see also Figure 2). In addition, disagreement also tends to move inversely
to the output gap. While the coeﬃcients in these regressions are comparable
to those for inﬂation and GDP growth, their explanatory power is considerably
higher, and the uncertainty term is signiﬁcant.
Table 4 analyzes drivers of disagreement about GDP growth. In contrast to
inﬂation and interest rates but in line with the evidence of panel A, disagreement
about GDP growth moves inversely with its level: disagreement rises in periods
of weak economic growth. Arguably, the eﬀects of GDP growth on disagreement
are non-linear: disagreement can be expected to rise during periods of heightened
uncertainty, which likely occur during recessions, but also when economic growth
accelerates considerably. (However, the latter periods are virtually absent in our
sample as GDP growth only rarely exceeds 5 percent.) In fact, the coeﬃcient
on shocks to GDP σ2
GDP,t is estimated to be positive, high and overwhelmingly
signiﬁcant. As for disagreement about inﬂation and interest rates, variation in
interest rates analyzed in model 4 also improves the performance of the regression
(measured with adjusted R2).
22The output gap used here is the ex post estimate taken from OECD’s Economic Outlook.
The series is quarterly, interpolated constant within each quarter, and starts in 1991:Q1.19
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Given the large share of consumption expenditure on output, it is not sur-
prising that the ﬁndings for consumption in Table 5 mirror quite closely those
for GDP. The results are qualitatively similar for investment and unemployment
rate although the explanatory power of investment regressions is smaller (as dis-
agreement about investment tends to move more, much of which is unrelated to
the explanatory macro variables).
The results in panel B are also broadly agree with the bivariate illustration
of the relationship between time-averaged disagreement and the level/variance
of the underlying variable in the bottom panels of Figure 7. While the ﬁrst
correlation is close to zero (for reasons outlined above), the one for variance,
which proxies better for underlying uncertainty, is positive and quite strong.
Our ﬁndings in this and the previous section are in line with Mankiw et al.
(2003) and D¨ opke and Fritsche (2006). Mankiw et al. (2003) report that in the
US disagreement about inﬂation increases with its level and absolute value of
its change, in particular when the change is sharp, and though it shows anti-
cyclical pattern after 1975 or so for consumers, its dependence on the phase of
the business cycle is less clear for experts. D¨ opke and Fritsche (2006) ﬁnd that
dispersion of inﬂation and growth expectations in Germany is high before and
during recessions and correlates positively with macroeconomic uncertainty.
3.5. Disagreement and Central Bank Independence. It might be a priori
expected that better macroeconomic policy alleviates economic uncertainty and
disagreement. Without going into much detail about measuring the quality of
economic institutions, panel C of Tables 2–7 provides a simple illustration of
how much better and more credible monetary policy aﬀects disagreement about
various variables. In particular, we attempt to capture credibility of monetary
policy using an indicator of central bank independence as deﬁned in Table 8.23
We estimate two versions of the following regression
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 × xt + β3 × σ2
x,t +
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 × Δpolicy rate2
t + ut.
Although the dummy for central bank independence (CB Independencet)i sn e g -
ative for all variables, it is larger and highly statistically signiﬁcant for only for
inﬂation, interest rate and unemployment. Quantitatively, the reduction in dis-
agreement related to central bank independence is largest for the two nominal
variables, interest rates and inﬂation, 41% and 35% respectively; for real vari-
ables it ranges between 5% and 20%. In addition, while the explanatory power
of these regressions is substantially larger than those with recession dummies of
23We intentionally use a simple indicator, which transparently tracks central bank inde-
pendence throughout our sample. The indicator is broadly in line with a measure of political
autonomy of central banks recently calculated by Arnone, Laurens, Segalotto, and Sommer
(2007), who use the methodology proposed by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) and
Cukierman (1992). Their approach deﬁnes political autonomy as the ability of central banks
to select the ﬁnal objectives of monetary policy and measures it using a combination of eight
criteria related to how the governor and the board of directors are appointed, the relations with
government and the nature of the laws relevant for central banks.20
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model 2 (and for inﬂation even marginally larger than those with recession and
post-1998 dummies of model 2) for nominal variables, this result reverses for real
variables (where adjusted R2s of model 4 are low).
Model 6 attempts to separate the eﬀects of central bank independence and
other factors (by including macroeconomic control variables of Panel B jointly).
The estimates imply that the monetary policy indicator remains overwhelmingly
signiﬁcant for nominal variables but not for real indicators (except unemploy-
ment). For most variables, the point estimate of β1 changes only modestly
(relative to model 5). At the same time other parameters turn out to be broadly
comparable in size to estimates of β3 of Panel B).
These ﬁndings suggest that (i) higher central bank independence coincides
with a substantial decline in disagreement and (ii) the eﬀect is particularly pro-
nounced for nominal variables.24 While the ﬁrst result, the quantiﬁcation of
eﬀects of central bank independence on disagreement, is to our knowledge new,
it is related to the large literature on economic eﬀects of central bank inde-
pendence (Rogoﬀ, 1985; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Alesina and Gatti, 1995
and many others). Most empirical work in that ﬁeld agrees that central bank
independence promotes price stability although its eﬀects on real economic per-
formance are hard to detect reliably, which is broadly in line with our second
ﬁnding.
The second result can also be explained with the introduction of clear man-
dates in terms of price stability (including inﬂation targeting) in some countries
in our sample and more generally with the adoption of more predictable mone-
tary policy and increased and improved communication of central bankers with
other economic agents. The eﬀect of these developments is stronger for nominal
variables, which are directly aﬀected by explicit inﬂation targets or communica-
tion about possible future paths of policy rates. On the other hand, disagreement
about real variables, whose future dynamics central bank typically communicate
less extensively, is less sensitive to the institutional setting of monetary policy.
The explanatory power of our regressions is quite low; adjusted R2 often
ranges between 0.1 and 0.2. This is perhaps not surprising because Figures 1–6
show that disagreement is subject to much transitory variation, which cannot
easily be captured with the explanatory variables and simple models we use.
The disagreement series we construct is subject to much measurement and sam-
pling uncertainty: questions that aim to capture expectations about economic
variables can be challenging to answer even for professional forecasters; we use
monthly data, which are generally known to be noisy; we attempt to extract
cross-sectional variation from a sample of about 20–30 experts. However, we
believe the data still do provide interesting information because many of the
coeﬃcients we estimate are overwhelmingly signiﬁcant and reasonable in size.
24Related work of Crowe and Meade (2008) ﬁnds that higher central bank transparency is
associated with more accurate private sector inﬂation forecasts.21
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4. Disagreement Across Countries
While panel analysis is useful in summarizing the general trends in deter-
minants of disagreement, averaging wipes out information about cross-country
heterogeneity. The analysis of this section attempts to capture and interpret
such heterogeneity.
4.1. Country-by-Country Regression Analysis. Tables 9–14 summarize the
cross-country diﬀerences in the drivers of disagreement by estimating models 2
and 4 (of Tables 2–7) separately country by country.25
The results are broadly consistent with the panel analysis of the previous
section. While most coeﬃcients are signed in line with our priors, some of them
are insigniﬁcant because of their smaller size and because of their larger standard
errors caused in part by fewer observations (roughly 200 compared to roughly
7 × 200 for panel estimates).
The top panel of Table 9 divides countries into two groups depending on
how much disagreement about inﬂation varies over time. In Canada, France,
Germany and the United States this variable is rather insensitive to the phase
of the business cycle and constant over the two time periods (pre-1999 and post-
1998): while the coeﬃcients β1 and β2 are sometimes signiﬁcant (and almost
always have the correct sign), the explanatory power of the regressions in these
countries is rather low—about 0.1 or less in terms of adjusted R2—because the
coeﬃcients tend to be smaller than in the remaining countries. In contrast, in
Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom the two variables explain up to 40 percent
of the variation in disagreement about inﬂation (in adjusted R2 terms). Findings
consistent with the top panel are shown in the bottom panel: disagreement in
Italy, Japan and the UK is much more sensitive to macro variables (inﬂation
level and its variation, output gap and variation in policy interest rates), with
adjusted R2 of as much as 0.5, than in the rest of the sample, where coeﬃcients
are often insigniﬁcant or small.
Analogous regressions for short-run interest rates shown in Table 10 are broadly
consistent with those for inﬂation, even though the diﬀerence in sensitivity of
disagreement for the two country groups is less pronounced: adjusted R2s for
Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom range around 0.4–0.5 (in both panels);
those for other countries average to about 0.25. This ﬁnding seems reasonable,
as the existence of and independent central bank and/or explicit numeric in-
ﬂation target can help stabilize inﬂation expectations and reduce disagreement
25To remind, model 2 has the form:
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + ut,
and model 4:
disagrt = β0 + β2 × xt + β3 × σ
2
x,t + β4 × output gapt + β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut.
Detailed results for all models are available in the the online appendix. Regressions of Panel
C of of Tables 2–7 are not investigated as monetary policy institutions vary little within each
country.22
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about inﬂation. In contrast, such targets are not announced for interest rates
(or other variables).
Properties of disagreement about real variables in continental Europe diﬀer
from Anglo–Saxon countries. Top panels of Tables 11–14 suggest that disagree-
ment about GDP, consumption, investment and to some extent also unemploy-
ment tends to be less counter-cyclical in France, Germany and Italy. For exam-
ple, cross-sectional dispersion in GDP forecasts increases in recessions by roughly
30 percent in the three countries while it is 73 percent higher in the US. This
ﬁnding corresponds closely to the well-known result that macroeconomic volatil-
ity is lower in the euro area than in the US (see Doyle and Faust, 2005 and
Giannone and Reichlin, 2005 for evidence on GDP and consumption).
Other than that the results for real variables variables—GDP, consumption,
investment and unemployment rate, shown in Tables 11, 12, 13 and 14 respectively—
exhibit little systematic variation across countries. The ﬁnding that the link
between monetary policy institutions and sensitivity of disagreement about real
variables is not particularly pronounced could be explained by the fact that the
key (and typically sole) goal for monetary goal for monetary policy is safeguard-
ing of price stability. In contrast, central banks usually aﬀect output stability
only indirectly.
The level and sensitivity of disagreement about inﬂation and interest rates
relate quite closely to the fraction of the sample with an independent central
bank, shown in the right-most column of Table 8: Canada, France, Germany
and the United States have had an independent monetary authority for large
majority of the sample, while Japan and the UK for about half of the time.
4.2. Cross-Variable and Cross-Country Links between Disagreement.
We have also investigated the cross-country and cross-variable links in disagree-
ment. We only summarize them brieﬂy as not enough clear-cut results appear
to justify a more detailed exposition.26 First, for a given variable, disagreement
is typically moderately positively correlated across countries: the correlation are
around 0.2 (at monthly frequency). (Correlations increase to around 0.3–0.4 once
the data are aggregated to quarterly frequency by averaging.) Cross-country
correlations tend to be higher for more persistent variables: interest rate and
unemployment.
Cross-variable correlations (within a given country) are in the same ballpark
as the cross-country ones and suggest that disagreement about inﬂation and
GDP growth is relatively strongly correlated with other variables. Disagreement
is more synchronized in the UK and the US. Multivariate analysis of conditional
correlations—regressions of disagreement about one variable on disagreement
about the remaining variables—suggest that disagreement tends to co-move for
real variables, especially GDP, consumption and unemployment, and for nominal
variables, inﬂation and interest rate. Links between real and nominal variables
26Cross-variable and cross-country correlations in disagreement are given in Tables 16 and 17
in the Appendix.23
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are less important (conditional on correlations between variables from the same
group). We found little systematic pattern between countries in cross-country
conditional multivariate regressions (i.e., regressions of disagreement in one coun-
try on disagreement in others for a given variable).
5. Turbulent Expectations 2008–2009
This section investigates in detail the dynamics of the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of expectations during the ongoing ﬁnancial turbulence. To describe these
dynamics we extend our data set until March 2009 and augment it with data for
the euro area.
Figure 20 illustrates the eﬀects of the turmoil on disagreement about inﬂation
and GDP growth.27 Although the recession in continental Europe and Japan
has according to CEPR’s business cycle dating committee and ECRI oﬃcially
started28 in the late 2007 or early 2008, substantial increase in disagreement
occurred only in the late 2008, following the fall of the investment bank Lehman
Brothers in September, the considerable intensiﬁcation of uncertainty on global
ﬁnancial markets and the worsening of the macroeconomic outlook. By con-
trast, disagreement about inﬂation and GDP in the US—the epicenter of the
turbulence—gradually started to increase much earlier, right after the crisis broke
in the summer 2007. Disagreement in the UK, whose ﬁnancial sector is large and
closely linked with the US, evolved as an intermediate case between the US and
continental Europe, starting to increase in the summer 2008. While before the
turmoil the level of disagreement was roughly the same in all countries, the im-
pact of the crisis on disagreement about GDP in Japan and disagreement about
inﬂation in the UK and the US was signiﬁcantly larger, reﬂecting sharper and
larger revisions of forecasts of these variables in the late 2008 and early 2009.29
Figures 21 and 22 display the cross-sectional distribution of GDP and inﬂa-
tion expectations (estimated using kernel density). The pre-crisis (June 2007)
distribution of expectations is very peaked reﬂecting the widespread agreement
among forecasters. Before September 2008 expectations became more dispersed
as the underlying variables moved and uncertainty was increasing. Comparison
of peaks of the distributions across regions suggests that expectations in the euro
area are more centered than in the UK and the US: For example, the probabil-
ity weight on the mode of the euro area distribution of GDP (around 1) has
typically exceeded those in the UK and the US (around 0.7). (This observation
27Shaded areas again mark recessions as determined by ECRI and, for the euro area, by
CEPR’s business cycle dating committee.
28We refer to the dates identiﬁed by CEPR’s business cycle dating committee for the euro
area, by NBER’s business cycle dating committee for the US, and by ECRI for other regions.
29For example, one-year ahead consensus expectations of GDP growth in Japan plummeted
from 1.3 percent in August 2008 to −4.7 percent in March 2009. Consensus expectations of
inﬂation in the UK and the US, peaked in August 2008 at 3.8 and 3.6 percent respectively
before declining to 0.6 in the UK and −0.5 percent in the US in March 2009. (By comparison,
inﬂation expectations in the euro area increased from roughly 2 percent before the crisis to 3
percent in July 2008 and fell to 0.7 percent in March 2009.)24
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remains broadly valid also for individual large euro area member countries shown
in Figure 22.) The more spread-out distributions in the UK and US coincide
with more vigorous and volatile dynamics of the underlying variables and con-
sensus expectations, in particular in the case of inﬂation (which has remained
more stable in the euro area and its large members).
30 Finally, the ﬁgures sug-
gest that disagreement in most countries peaked in the early 2009 and decreased
somewhat in March 2009.
6. Conclusion
Our estimates document a dichotomy between disagreement about real vari-
ables (GDP, consumption, investment and unemployment), which is more strongly
aﬀected by real factors, and disagreement about nominal variables (inﬂation and
interest rate), which reacts to the institutional setting of monetary policy (in par-
ticular central bank independence). Disagreement about real variables intensiﬁes
strongly during recessions. Disagreement about nominal variables is consider-
ably lower under independent central banks. Cross-sectional dispersion for both
groups increases with uncertainty about the underlying indicators. Country-by-
country regressions for inﬂation and interest rates reveal that both the level of
disagreement and its sensitivity to macroeconomic variables tend to be larger in
Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, where central banks became independent
only around the mid-1990s.
Our ﬁndings suggest that more credible monetary policy can substantially con-
tribute to the anchoring of expectations about nominal variables; its eﬀects on
disagreement about real variables are moderate. While our analysis uses data on
expectations of professional forecasters, qualitatively similar results may obtain
also for other economists (in industry, government and academia) and house-
holds. This could be the case if our data are taken as a proxy for expectations of
the rest of population, or if news spread epidemiologically from experts to other
agents (as proposed by Carroll, 2003).
To our knowledge, the results in this paper provide one of the ﬁrst joint analy-
ses of individual survey expectations across countries and variables. The strength
of some signals we use to investigate disagreement has been relatively weak: fol-
lowing the Great Moderation, economic shocks in our sample (1989–2006) have
been quite modest. Further insights about expectations and disagreement will
be gained once the data points covering the recent global turbulence accumulate.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics, All Countries, Full Sample
Statistic Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
INFL
Average # Forecasters 16.40 18.07 28.02 14.53 18.27 32.84 28.16
Average Expectation Error
† 0.21 0.15 −0.01 0.04 0.14 0.28 0.05
Average MSE 1.87 0.43 0.81 0.75 0.66 1.19 0.92
Average Level of INFL 2.31 1.89 2.19 3.49 0.59 3.20 2.94
Variance of INFL 2.05 0.59 1.73 2.62 1.76 3.96 1.08
Average Disagreement 0.34 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.38 0.33
R3M
Average # Forecasters 16.36 17.98 25.61 11.99 19.09 31.05 26.77
Average Expectation Error
† 0.55 0.03 0.25 0.20 0.48 0.57 0.35
Average MSE 2.71 1.39 0.93 2.53 1.00 1.60 2.14
Average Level of R3M 5.35 5.20 4.72 6.76 1.78 6.75 4.55
Variance of R3M 7.76 8.64 5.97 16.29 6.37 9.08 3.77
Average Disagreement 0.76 0.50 0.46 0.58 0.27 0.71 0.56
GDP
Average # Forecasters 16.41 18.18 27.65 14.56 18.39 33.03 28.19
Average Expectation Error
† −0.02 0.45 0.17 0.59 0.38 −0.26 −0.25
Average MSE 3.52 2.06 3.10 2.82 3.63 1.90 2.59
Average Level of GDP 2.65 1.85 1.85 1.37 1.46 2.33 2.89
Variance of GDP 3.98 1.49 3.38 1.90 3.34 2.02 2.03
Average Disagreement 0.46 0.30 0.34 0.26 0.69 0.43 0.38
CONS
Average # Forecasters 16.40 18.16 27.90 14.51 18.37 32.65 28.00
Average Expectation Error
† −0.23 0.16 −0.06 0.40 0.18 −0.26 −0.54
Average MSE 2.23 1.66 2.38 3.90 2.19 2.46 1.86
Average Level of CONS 2.68 2.03 1.71 1.43 1.71 2.59 3.23
Variance of CONS 2.39 1.54 2.77 2.91 2.55 2.71 1.46
Average Disagreement 0.47 0.31 0.40 0.34 0.65 0.55 0.38
INV
Average # Forecasters 16.29 17.81 27.64 14.53 17.98 31.99 27.86
Average Expectation Error
† 2.43 1.38 2.61 1.35 1.74 −0.57 1.31
Average MSE 46.67 20.90 32.41 22.20 42.06 16.89 23.66
Average Level of INV 3.66 2.26 1.67 1.81 −0.19 2.89 4.13
Variance of INV 35.83 15.07 19.73 22.32 13.84 23.31 20.11
Average Disagreement 2.60 1.17 1.56 1.01 2.42 1.66 1.93
UN
Average # Forecasters 16.41 18.07 27.65 13.99 17.98 32.32 28.12
Average Expectation Error
† −0.02 0.43 0.05 0.79 −0.01 0.63 0.07
Average MSE 0.81 0.89 1.09 0.97 0.18 1.21 0.42
Average Level of UN 8.54 9.98 9.58 9.95 3.75 5.34 5.50
Variance of UN 2.50 1.30 2.79 2.06 1.28 5.88 0.93
Average Disagreement 0.29 0.24 0.41 0.33 0.25 0.31 0.22
Notes: Averages taken across forecasters and time periods. † : {*,**,***}=Statistical signiﬁcance at
{10,5,1} percent.29
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Table 2. Disagreement and Business Cycle—Panel Results, INFL
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 ¯ R2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + ut
1. 0.299∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.003)
2. 0.327∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ 0.129
(0.005) (0.017) (0.014)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagrt = β0 + β2 × INFLt + β3 × σ2
INFL,t + β4 × output gapt +
+ β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
3. 0.237∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.076
(0.006) (0.005)
4. 0.223∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.227 −0.017∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.093
(0.008) (0.006) (0.155) (0.006) (0.023)
Panel C: Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 × INFLt + β3 × σ2
INFL,t +
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
5. 0.420∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ 0.169
(0.006) (0.025)
6. 0.381∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗ 0.004 0.235∗ −0.020∗∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.230
(0.013) (0.031) (0.007) (0.138) (0.005) (0.020)
Notes: Fixed eﬀects estimators, HAC standard errors, Bartlett kernel, bandwidth = 12
lags. The dependent variable is measured as cross-sectional IQR. β0 denotes the average
of country-speciﬁc intercepts. “post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0
before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1
during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 otherwise.
“output gapt” denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook
quarterly output gap revisions database (in August 2008). σ2
INFL,t denotes variance
of the permanent component of INFL. “CB Independencet” denotes a 0–1 indicator of
independent monetary policy deﬁned in table 8.30
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Table 3. Disagreement and Business Cycle—Panel Results, R3M
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 ¯ R2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + ut
1. 0.549∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.007)
2. 0.624∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗ 0.232
(0.009) (0.036) (0.026)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagrt = β0 + β2 × R3Mt + β3 × σ2
R3M,t + β4 × output gapt +
+ β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
3. 0.319∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.276
(0.011) (0.005)
4. 0.363∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗ −0.015 0.041∗ 0.229
(0.013) (0.008) (0.187) (0.010) (0.023)
Panel C: Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 × R3Mt + β3 × σ2
R3M,t +
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
5. 0.783∗∗∗ −0.294∗∗∗ 0.165
(0.011) (0.035)
6. 0.554∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.286 −0.021∗∗ 0.034 0.272
(0.025) (0.046) (0.009) (0.180) (0.009) (0.023)
Notes: Fixed eﬀects estimators, HAC standard errors, Bartlett kernel, bandwidth = 12
lags. The dependent variable is measured as cross-sectional IQR. β0 denotes the average
of country-speciﬁc intercepts. “post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0
before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1
during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 otherwise.
“output gapt” denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook
quarterly output gap revisions database (in August 2008). σ2
R3M,t denotes variance
of the permanent component of R3M. “CB Independencet” denotes a 0–1 indicator of
independent monetary policy deﬁned in table 8.31
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Table 4. Disagreement and Business Cycle—Panel Results, GDP
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 ¯ R2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + ut
1. 0.410∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.004)
2. 0.394∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ −0.032∗ 0.134
(0.006) (0.027) (0.018)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagrt = β0 + β2 × GDPt + β3 × σ2
GDP,t + β4 × output gapt +
+ β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
3. 0.482∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ 0.107
(0.007) (0.006)
4. 0.379∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ −0.001 0.048 0.136
(0.013) (0.007) (0.180) (0.007) (0.035)
Panel C: Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 × GDPt + β3 × σ2
GDP,t +
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
5. 0.458∗∗∗ −0.061∗ 0.010
(0.007) (0.034)
6. 0.424∗∗∗ −0.060∗ −0.023∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ −0.004 0.038 0.149
(0.017) (0.031) (0.006) (0.178) (0.007) (0.033)
Notes: Fixed eﬀects estimators, HAC standard errors, Bartlett kernel, bandwidth = 12
lags. The dependent variable is measured as cross-sectional IQR. β0 denotes the average
of country-speciﬁc intercepts. “post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0
before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1
during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 otherwise.
“output gapt” denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook
quarterly output gap revisions database (in August 2008). σ2
GDP,t denotes variance
of the permanent component of GDP. “CB Independencet” denotes a 0–1 indicator of
independent monetary policy deﬁned in table 8.32
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Table 5. Disagreement and Business Cycle—Panel Results, CONS
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 ¯ R2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + ut
1. 0.445∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.004)
2. 0.419∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ −0.012 0.128
(0.006) (0.024) (0.015)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagrt = β0 + β2 × CONSt + β3 × σ2
CONS,t + β4 × output gapt +
+ β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
3. 0.512∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ 0.073
(0.007) (0.007)
4. 0.452∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ −0.002 0.044∗ 0.088
(0.011) (0.008) (0.077) (0.007) (0.024)
Panel C: Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 × CONSt + β3 × σ2
CONS,t +
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
5. 0.469∗∗∗ −0.031 −0.001
(0.007) (0.030)
6. 0.458∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.023∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ −0.002 0.043∗ 0.088
(0.017) (0.031) (0.008) (0.082) (0.007) (0.024)
Notes: Fixed eﬀects estimators, HAC standard errors, Bartlett kernel, bandwidth = 12
lags. The dependent variable is measured as cross-sectional IQR. β0 denotes the average
of country-speciﬁc intercepts. “post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0
before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1
during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 otherwise.
“output gapt” denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook
quarterly output gap revisions database (in August 2008). σ2
CONS,t denotes variance of
the permanent component of CONS. “CB Independencet” denotes a 0–1 indicator of
independent monetary policy deﬁned in table 8.33
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Table 6. Disagreement and Business Cycle—Panel Results, INV
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 ¯ R2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + ut
1. 1.764∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.017)
2. 1.702∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ −0.002 0.029
(0.025) (0.103) (0.071)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagrt = β0 + β2 × INVt + β3 × σ2
INV,t + β4 × output gapt +
+ β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
3. 1.784∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ 0.027
(0.019) (0.008)
4. 1.582∗∗∗ −0.016∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.006 0.066 0.046
(0.037) (0.009) (0.066) (0.028) (0.117)
Panel C: Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 × INVt + β3 × σ2
INV,t +
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
5. 1.833∗∗∗ −0.086 −0.003
(0.019) (0.107)
6. 1.597∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.016∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.006 0.062 0.045
(0.057) (0.096) (0.010) (0.068) (0.029) (0.118)
Notes: Fixed eﬀects estimators, HAC standard errors, Bartlett kernel, bandwidth =
12 lags. The dependent variable is measured as cross-sectional IQR. β0 denotes the
average of country-speciﬁc intercepts. “post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which
equals 0 before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which
equals 1 during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and
0 otherwise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD
Economic Outlook quarterly output gap revisions database (in August 2008). σ2
INV,t
denotes variance of the permanent component of INV. “CB Independencet” denotes a
0–1 indicator of independent monetary policy deﬁned in table 8.34
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Table 7. Disagreement and Business Cycle—Panel Results, UN
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 ¯ R2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + ut
1. 0.293∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.005)
2. 0.297∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ 0.169
(0.006) (0.041) (0.018)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagrt = β0 + β2 × UNt + β3 × σ2
UN,t+ β4 × output gapt +
+ β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
3. 0.302∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.005
(0.023) (0.013)
4. 0.432∗∗∗ −0.034∗ 7.857∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.017 0.162
(0.027) (0.020) (1.927) (0.008) (0.014)
Panel C: Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 × UNt + β3 × σ2
UN,t+
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
5. 0.344∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗ 0.011
(0.023) (0.029)
6. 0.506∗∗∗ −0.050 −0.037∗ 7.284∗∗∗ −0.015∗ −0.023∗ 0.168
(0.036) (0.032) (0.020) (1.874) (0.009) (0.014)
Notes: Fixed eﬀects estimators, HAC standard errors, Bartlett kernel, bandwidth =
12 lags. The dependent variable is measured as cross-sectional IQR. β0 denotes the
average of country-speciﬁc intercepts. “post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which
equals 0 before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which
equals 1 during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and
0 otherwise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD
Economic Outlook quarterly output gap revisions database (in August 2008). σ2
UN,t
denotes variance of the permanent component of UN. “CB Independencet” denotes a
0–1 indicator of independent monetary policy deﬁned in table 8.35
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Table 9. Disagreement Over Time and Business Cycle—
Country-by-Country Results, INFL
Country β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 ¯ R2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × recessiont + β2 × post-1998t + ut
CN 0.353∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ −0.054∗ 0.112
(0.020) (0.026) (0.029)
FR 0.212∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.006 −0.007
(0.012) (0.021) (0.015)
GE 0.224∗∗∗ 0.005 0.041∗ 0.056
(0.013) (0.022) (0.022)
IT 0.310∗∗∗ 0.096∗ −0.137∗∗∗ 0.349
(0.022) (0.055) (0.025)
JP 0.376∗∗∗ 0.055∗ −0.145∗∗∗ 0.321
(0.024) (0.031) (0.028)
UK 0.503∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.268∗∗∗ 0.414
(0.062) (0.081) (0.063)
US 0.324∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗ −0.005 0.088
(0.012) (0.052) (0.024)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × INFLt + β2 × σ2
INFL,t +
+ β3 × output gapt + β4 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
CN 0.302∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ −0.308 −0.004 0.069∗∗∗ 0.176
(0.045) (0.010) (0.241) (0.011) (0.017)
FR 0.203∗∗∗ −0.013 0.678 −0.004 0.000 −0.000
(0.027) (0.011) (0.641) (0.010) (0.024)
GE 0.252∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.014 −0.012 0.022 0.042
(0.022) (0.012) (0.481) (0.008) (0.073)
IT 0.076∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 1.107 −0.016∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.363
(0.027) (0.010) (1.003) (0.009) (0.019)
JP 0.163∗∗∗ −0.007 2.019∗∗∗ 0.004 0.007 0.218
(0.036) (0.017) (0.445) (0.008) (0.009)
UK 0.314∗∗∗ −0.007 0.373 −0.137∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.527
(0.057) (0.026) (0.669) (0.027) (0.072)
US 0.280∗∗∗ 0.001 0.296∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.112
(0.043) (0.015) (0.120) (0.007) (0.061)
Notes: Country-by-country regressions, Newey–West standard errors, 12 lags. The
dependent variable is measured as cross-sectional IQR. β0 denotes the average of
country-speciﬁc intercepts.“post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0
before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1
during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 other-
wise. σ2
INFL,t denotes variance of the permanent component of INFL. “output gapt”
denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook quarterly
output gap revisions database (in August 2008).37
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Table 10. Disagreement Over Time and Business Cycle—
Country-by-Country Results, R3M
Country β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 ¯ R2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × recessiont + β2 × post-1998t + ut
CN 0.885∗∗∗ 0.190 −0.328∗∗∗ 0.295
(0.084) (0.187) (0.093)
FR 0.514∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗ −0.101∗∗ 0.221
(0.033) (0.111) (0.042)
GE 0.477∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗ −0.126∗∗ 0.191
(0.054) (0.049) (0.049)
IT 0.720∗∗∗ 0.149∗ −0.341∗∗∗ 0.405
(0.050) (0.080) (0.052)
JP 0.417∗∗∗ −0.052 −0.267∗∗∗ 0.513
(0.026) (0.041) (0.050)
UK 0.827∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗ 0.399
(0.074) (0.086) (0.078)
US 0.549∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.008 0.031
(0.035) (0.044) (0.056)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × R3Mt + β2 × σ2
R3M,t +
+ β3 × output gapt + β4 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
CN 0.543∗∗∗ 0.026 −0.263 −0.053∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.213
(0.079) (0.021) (0.574) (0.026) (0.036)
FR 0.444∗∗∗ −0.018∗ 1.695∗∗∗ 0.007 0.030 0.460
(0.037) (0.010) (0.393) (0.016) (0.090)
GE 0.232∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.886 −0.032∗∗∗ −0.046 0.248
(0.053) (0.015) (1.297) (0.011) (0.198)
IT 0.251∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.053 −0.045∗∗∗ 0.008 0.435
(0.057) (0.018) (0.281) (0.012) (0.067)
JP 0.243∗∗∗ −0.021 1.798 0.071∗∗∗ 0.020 0.580
(0.025) (0.015) (2.289) (0.011) (0.012)
UK 0.634∗∗∗ −0.020 3.187∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.102 0.463
(0.105) (0.022) (1.100) (0.037) (0.086)
US 0.625∗∗∗ −0.024 0.441 −0.007 0.112 0.058
(0.072) (0.015) (0.972) (0.019) (0.095)
Notes: Country-by-country regressions, Newey–West standard errors, 12 lags. The
dependent variable is measured as cross-sectional IQR. β0 denotes the average of
country-speciﬁc intercepts.“post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0
before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1
during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 other-
wise. σ2
R3M,t denotes variance of the permanent component of R3M. “output gapt”
denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook quarterly
output gap revisions database (in August 2008).38
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Table 11. Disagreement Over Time and Business Cycle—
Country-by-Country Results, GDP
Country β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 ¯ R2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × recessiont + β2 × post-1998t + ut
CN 0.492∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗ 0.240
(0.025) (0.045) (0.049)
FR 0.283∗∗∗ 0.027 0.036 0.037
(0.011) (0.039) (0.024)
GE 0.340∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ 0.214
(0.023) (0.040) (0.033)
IT 0.241∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.025 0.076
(0.024) (0.044) (0.027)
JP 0.589∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.029 0.141
(0.053) (0.080) (0.083)
UK 0.477∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ 0.387
(0.036) (0.055) (0.040)
US 0.348∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.015 0.211
(0.026) (0.061) (0.031)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × GDPt + β2 × σ2
GDP,t +
+ β3 × output gapt + β4 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
CN 0.233∗∗∗ 0.003 1.684∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗ 0.011 0.321
(0.083) (0.013) (0.526) (0.011) (0.021)
FR 0.406∗∗∗ −0.032∗ −0.588 0.038∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.112
(0.073) (0.017) (0.630) (0.012) (0.052)
GE 0.256∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ −0.017 0.074 0.227
(0.032) (0.010) (0.240) (0.014) (0.118)
IT 0.318∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗ −0.091 0.010 0.022 0.084
(0.038) (0.012) (0.351) (0.011) (0.030)
JP 0.717∗∗∗ −0.032 0.116 −0.001 0.030 0.028
(0.166) (0.032) (0.644) (0.019) (0.052)
UK 0.316∗∗∗ −0.012 2.648∗∗∗ −0.026 0.109 0.478
(0.047) (0.010) (0.668) (0.020) (0.075)
US 0.439∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ 0.598 0.027∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.429
(0.061) (0.011) (0.372) (0.011) (0.106)
Notes: Country-by-country regressions, Newey–West standard errors, 12 lags. The
dependent variable is measured as cross-sectional IQR. β0 denotes the average of
country-speciﬁc intercepts.“post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0
before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1
during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 other-
wise. σ2
GDP,t denotes variance of the permanent component of GDP. “output gapt”
denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook quarterly
output gap revisions database (in August 2008).39
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Table 12. Disagreement Over Time and Business Cycle—
Country-by-Country Results, CONS
Country β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 ¯ R2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × recessiont + β2 × post-1998t + ut
CN 0.478∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ −0.071∗ 0.208
(0.031) (0.080) (0.040)
FR 0.285∗∗∗ 0.046 0.031 0.038
(0.010) (0.033) (0.021)
GE 0.377∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗ −0.013 0.079
(0.031) (0.035) (0.033)
IT 0.321∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.006 0.166
(0.017) (0.066) (0.027)
JP 0.561∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.016 0.170
(0.033) (0.053) (0.054)
UK 0.548∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ −0.043 0.146
(0.039) (0.052) (0.050)
US 0.364∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.003 0.182
(0.026) (0.059) (0.029)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × CONSt + β2 × σ2
CONS,t +
+ β3 × output gapt + β4 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
CN 0.350∗∗∗ −0.014 1.129∗∗∗ 0.007 0.037 0.324
(0.076) (0.021) (0.286) (0.012) (0.043)
FR 0.355∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.318∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗ 0.013 0.052
(0.027) (0.007) (0.120) (0.009) (0.041)
GE 0.350∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ −0.018∗ −0.064 0.150
(0.029) (0.010) (0.102) (0.011) (0.093)
IT 0.310∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗ 0.375∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.002 0.196
(0.022) (0.009) (0.161) (0.013) (0.027)
JP 0.764∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.332 0.012 0.039 0.004
(0.133) (0.028) (0.413) (0.033) (0.033)
UK 0.506∗∗∗ −0.023 0.848 0.018 0.183∗∗∗ 0.212
(0.106) (0.014) (0.636) (0.025) (0.070)
US 0.294∗∗∗ −0.008 1.851∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.293
(0.057) (0.012) (0.313) (0.008) (0.089)
Notes: Country-by-country regressions, Newey–West standard errors, 12 lags. The
dependent variable is measured as cross-sectional IQR. β0 denotes the average of
country-speciﬁc intercepts.“post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0 be-
fore 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1 dur-
ing recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 otherwise.
σ2
CONS,t denotes variance of the permanent component of CONS. “output gapt”d e -
notes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook quarterly
output gap revisions database (in August 2008).40
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Table 13. Disagreement Over Time and Business Cycle—
Country-by-Country Results, INV
Country β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 ¯ R2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × recessiont + β2 × post-1998t + ut
CN 2.929∗∗∗ −0.369∗ −0.619∗∗ 0.083
(0.150) (0.192) (0.248)
FR 1.170∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.004 −0.010
(0.037) (0.093) (0.100)
GE 1.284∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.201
(0.104) (0.119) (0.112)
IT 1.027∗∗∗ 0.224 −0.085 0.024
(0.117) (0.142) (0.183)
JP 2.141∗∗∗ 0.294 0.346 0.061
(0.165) (0.296) (0.271)
UK 1.641∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ −0.147 0.224
(0.114) (0.178) (0.149)
US 1.845∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗ −0.003 0.217
(0.097) (0.117) (0.138)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × INVt + β2 × σ2
INV,t +
+ β3 × output gapt + β4 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
CN 1.646∗∗∗ 0.017 0.580∗∗∗ 0.179∗ 0.125 0.170
(0.252) (0.020) (0.162) (0.093) (0.177)
FR 1.244∗∗∗ −0.026∗ −0.047 0.034 0.050 0.037
(0.100) (0.014) (0.161) (0.043) (0.238)
GE 1.745∗∗∗ −0.029∗ −0.079 0.047 0.032 0.061
(0.119) (0.016) (0.091) (0.035) (0.513)
IT 0.661∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.004 0.217
(0.124) (0.015) (0.088) (0.059) (0.087)
JP 2.227∗∗∗ 0.059 0.032 −0.188∗∗∗ −1.426 0.110
(0.352) (0.038) (0.491) (0.071) (0.931)
UK 1.725∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ 0.017 0.051 0.309 0.228
(0.182) (0.011) (0.118) (0.050) (0.294)
US 1.825∗∗∗ −0.030 0.365 −0.001 0.968 0.168
(0.264) (0.023) (0.273) (0.054) (0.630)
Notes: Country-by-country regressions, Newey–West standard errors, 12 lags. The
dependent variable is measured as cross-sectional IQR. β0 denotes the average of
country-speciﬁc intercepts.“post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0
before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals
1 during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 oth-
erwise. σ2
INV,t denotes variance of the permanent component of INV. “output gapt”
denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook quarterly
output gap revisions database (in August 2008).41
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Table 14. Disagreement Over Time and Business Cycle—
Country-by-Country Results, UN
Country β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 ¯ R2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × recessiont + β2 × post-1998t + ut
CN 0.330∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ 0.375
(0.012) (0.027) (0.023)
FR 0.238∗∗∗ 0.035 −0.004 0.011
(0.015) (0.036) (0.019)
GE 0.410∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ 0.395
(0.061) (0.125) (0.097)
IT 0.344∗∗∗ 0.166 −0.066 0.100
(0.038) (0.159) (0.044)
JP 0.208∗∗∗ 0.042 0.051 0.086
(0.030) (0.030) (0.033)
UK 0.337∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ 0.498
(0.020) (0.046) (0.027)
US 0.217∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗ −0.013 0.121
(0.009) (0.040) (0.019)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × UNt + β2 × σ2
UN,t+
+ β3 × output gapt + β4 × Δpolicy rate
2
t + ut
CN 0.240 −0.011 4.563∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.011 0.323
(0.152) (0.023) (1.698) (0.011) (0.011)
FR 0.555∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗ 7.160∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ 0.091 0.190
(0.141) (0.015) (3.337) (0.015) (0.076)
GE 2.227∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗ 8.193∗∗ −0.061∗∗ 0.450∗ 0.662
(0.428) (0.040) (3.932) (0.030) (0.240)
IT 0.057 0.017 7.452∗ −0.033 −0.093 0.165
(0.163) (0.015) (4.149) (0.023) (0.063)
JP 0.335∗∗∗ −0.006 −7.022 −0.027∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗ 0.122
(0.068) (0.024) (7.079) (0.008) (0.005)
UK 0.139∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 6.233∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.066 0.628
(0.027) (0.006) (1.095) (0.016) (0.040)
US 0.306∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗ 5.979∗∗ −0.005 −0.026 0.073
(0.060) (0.014) (2.644) (0.009) (0.031)
Notes: Country-by-country regressions, Newey–West standard errors, 12 lags. The
dependent variable is measured as cross-sectional IQR. β0 denotes the average of
country-speciﬁc intercepts.“post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0
before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals
1 during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 oth-
erwise. σ2
UN,t denotes variance of the permanent component of UN. “output gapt”
denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook quarterly
output gap revisions database (in August 2008).42
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Appendix—Additional Results
Table 15. Correlation between the Two Disagreement Mea-
sures (Cross-Sectional IQR and Standard Deviation)
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Inﬂation 0.75 0.61 0.58 0.82 0.68 0.92 0.70
Interest Rate 0.87 0.78 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.86 0.73
GDP 0.79 0.62 0.78 0.69 0.76 0.66 0.83
Consumption 0.78 0.51 0.69 0.68 0.76 0.72 0.82
Investment 0.72 0.67 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.71 0.75
Unemployment 0.79 0.66 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.85 0.7143
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Table 16: Correlation of Disagreement Across Countries (for each Vari-
able), Full Sample, Disagreement Measure: IQR
Variable Country Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK
INFL France 0.16
Germany 0.01 −0.05
Italy 0.28 0.25 −0.18
Japan 0.16 0.18 0.03 0.48
UK 0.35 0.23 −0.04 0.64 0.56
US 0.16 0.24 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.07
GDP France 0.12
Germany 0.25 0.08
Italy 0.19 0.21 0.32
Japan 0.13 0.15 0.26 0.15
UK 0.55 −0.04 0.12 0.15 0.02
US 0.37 0.29 0.01 0.26 −0.07 0.31
R3M France 0.27
Germany 0.38 0.38
Italy 0.34 0.42 0.41
Japan 0.41 0.22 0.28 0.52
UK 0.52 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.54
US 0.28 0.01 0.25 0.01 −0.05 0.09
CONS France 0.17
Germany −0.02 0.15
Italy 0.14 0.04 0.22
Japan 0.05 0.17 0.18 0.37
UK 0.32 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.06
US 0.40 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.30
INV France 0.01
Germany 0.00 0.20
Italy 0.31 0.30 0.27
Japan 0.11 0.10 0.30 0.19
UK 0.06 0.03 −0.02 0.03 0.03
US 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.29 0.22 0.36
UN France 0.09
Germany 0.39 0.02
Italy 0.13 0.33 0.34
Japan −0.13 0.19 −0.23 0.08
UK 0.53 −0.01 0.54 0.26 −0.29
US 0.36 −0.03 0.07 0.00 −0.01 0.2744
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Table 17: Correlation of Disagreement Across Variables Within Coun-
try, Full Sample, Disagreement Measure: IQR
Country Variable Inﬂation GDP Int. Rate Cons Inv
CN GDP 0.19
Interest Rate 0.22 0.27
Consumption 0.22 0.53 0.27
Investment 0.11 0.25 0.05 0.15
Unemployment 0.31 0.57 0.34 0.48 0.28
FR GDP 0.16
Interest Rate 0.26 0.14
Consumption 0.04 0.41 0.12
Investment 0.20 0.39 0.19 0.28
Unemployment 0.05 0.23 0.27 0.16 0.11
GE GDP −0.03
Interest Rate 0.09 0.18
Consumption 0.14 0.44 0.28
Investment 0.07 0.17 0.11 0.32
Unemployment −0.04 0.34 0.22 0.23 −0.08
IT GDP 0.17
Interest Rate 0.56 0.12
Consumption 0.25 0.39 0.16
Investment 0.29 0.36 0.23 0.32
Unemployment 0.31 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.26
JP GDP 0.26
Interest Rate 0.47 0.06
Consumption 0.24 0.57 0.08
Investment 0.13 0.53 −0.03 0.38
Unemployment 0.04 0.50 −0.14 0.39 0.26
UK GDP 0.49
Interest Rate 0.66 0.53
Consumption 0.31 0.59 0.33
Investment 0.37 0.56 0.41 0.52
Unemployment 0.47 0.63 0.61 0.45 0.56
US GDP 0.41
Interest Rate 0.31 0.22
Consumption 0.36 0.74 0.05
Investment 0.32 0.55 0.11 0.50
Unemployment 0.18 0.48 0.12 0.50 0.3745
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009


































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009




















































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009





































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009











































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009




































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009
































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009






























































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009









































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009







































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009











































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1082
August 2009
Figure 21. Cross-sectional Dynamics of GDP and Inﬂation Ex-
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Figure 22. Cross-sectional Dynamics of GDP and Inﬂation Ex-
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